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ABSTRACT 
 
The explosive growth of social networking has placed enormous 
pressure on one of the most fundamental of American institutions—the 
impartial jury.  Through social networking services like Facebook and 
Twitter, jurors have committed significant and often high-profile acts of 
misconduct.  Just recently, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a death 
sentence because a juror Tweeted about the case during deliberations. In 
light of the significant risks to a fair trial that arise when jurors 
communicate through social media during trial, judges must be vigilant 
in monitoring for potential outside influences and in deterring 
misconduct. 
 
In this Article, we present informal survey data from actual 
jurors on their use of social networking during trial.  We discuss the rise 
of web-based social networks like Facebook and Twitter, and the 
concerns that arise when jurors communicate about a case through 
social media before returning a verdict.  After surveying how courts have 
responded to jurors’ social media use, we describe the results of the 
informal survey.  The results support a growing consensus in the legal 
profession that courts should frequently, as a matter of course, instruct 
jurors not to use social media to communicate about trial.  Although 
others have stressed the importance of jury instructions in this area, we 
hope that the informal survey data will further the dialogue by providing 
an important perspective—that of actual jurors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 The explosive growth of social networking has placed enormous 
pressure on one of the most fundamental of American institutions—the 
impartial jury.  In recent years, social networking services like Facebook 
and Twitter have become frequent vehicles through which jurors commit 
misconduct.1  Just months ago, the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed a 
death sentence because a juror Tweeted during deliberations.2  In light of 
the significant risks to a fair trial that arise when jurors communicate 
through social media,3 judges must be vigilant in monitoring for potential 
outside influences and in deterring misconduct.4 
                                                
1 See, e.g., In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 739 F. 
Supp. 2d 576, 609 n.215 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that juror misconduct on the 
Internet has “become a recurring problem”).  We use the phrases “social 
networking” and “social media” interchangeably throughout our discussion.   
2 Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *1 (Ark. Dec. 8, 
2011); see also Jeannie Nuss, Death Row Inmate Gets New Trial After Juror 
Tweet, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/s 
tory/2011-12-08/juror-tweet-death-row/51 741370/1 (“The Arkansas Supreme 
Court . . . tossed out a death row inmate’s murder conviction and said he 
deserves a new trial because one juror slept and another tweeted during court 
proceedings.”). 
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State”); United States v. Fumo, 655 
F.3d 288, 303–08 (3d Cir. 2011) (summarizing defendant’s argument that 
No. 1] ENSURING AN IMPARTIAL JURY 3 
 In this Article, we present informal survey data from actual 
jurors on their use of social networking during trial.  Section I discusses 
the rise of web-based social networks like Facebook and Twitter.  
Section II addresses the concerns that arise when jurors communicate 
about a case through social media before returning a verdict.  After 
surveying how courts have responded to jurors’ social media use, Section 
III describes the results of the informal survey.  The results—which we 
stress are not scientific—support a growing consensus in the legal 
profession that courts should frequently, as a matter of course, instruct 
jurors not to use social media to communicate about trial.  Although 
others have stressed the importance of jury instructions in this area, we 
hope that the informal survey data will further the dialogue by providing 
an important perspective—that of actual jurors.  
 
I.  THE RISE OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
 With more than two billion users, 240 million of whom are in the 
United States,5 the Internet has enabled global communication, 
connectedness and access to information on a scale never before seen in 
human history.6  The Internet provides access to vast amounts of 
information in mere seconds, and most recently, has allowed users to 
                                                                                                         
“comments on Facebook and Twitter brought widespread public attention to the 
jury’s deliberations, creating a ‘cloud of intense and widespread media coverage 
. . . and [the] public expectation that a verdict [wa]s imminent[,]’ thereby 
violating his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial trial”). 
4 See, e.g., United States v. Juror No. One, No. 10-703, 2011 WL 6412039, at *6 
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2011) (“Courts must continually adapt to the potential effects 
of emerging technologies on the integrity of the trial and must be vigilant in 
anticipating and deterring jurors’ continued use of these mediums during their 
service to the judicial system.”). 
5 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS, INTERNET USERS (2009), 
available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.P2.  
6 See John N. Greer, Square Legal Pegs in Round Cyber Holes: The NSA, 
Lawfulness, and the Protection of Privacy Rights and Civil Liberties in Cyber 
Space, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 139, 140 & nn.2–3 (2010) (“The World Wide 
Web . . . has made us more interconnected than any time in human history.”) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  The Internet has even changed modern 
language.  See ‘Google,’ ‘Unibrow’ Added to Dictionary, USA TODAY (July 6, 
2006), http://www.usatoday.com/news/offbeat/2006-07-06-new-words_x.htm 
(“Merriam-Webster’s lexicographers have been largely preoccupied with 
technology and computers . . . . [And] have given formal definition to . . . the 
Internet’s most recognizable names.”); Barry Schwartz, Google Now a Verb in 
the Oxford English Dictionary, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH, June 29, 2006, 
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2058373/Google-Now-A-Verb-In-The-
Oxford-English-Dictionary. 
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broadcast their thoughts to millions while receiving near instantaneous 
responses through web-based “social networking” or “social media” 
services.7   
 
 These services, which include well known social networks like 
Facebook and Twitter, refer broadly to web-based platforms that allow 
individuals “to create a ‘profile’ of themselves and connect or link to 
others based upon overlapping interests, employment, schools or 
contacts.”8  The defining feature of social networking, for our purposes, 
is that it enables users to communicate with almost anyone, at any time, 
from anywhere.   
 
 This extraordinary ability to broadcast oneself and connect with 
others has transformed the utility of the Internet for many Americans.9  
Nielson recently reported that social networking websites have begun to 
“dominate Americans’ time online,” accounting for “nearly a quarter of 
total time spent on the Internet.”10  The exponential growth of social 
networking—in terms of both number of users and services—has 
prompted some to declare the makings of a “social media revolution.”11   
 
                                                
7 See, e.g., Jason H. Casell, To Tweet or Not to Tweet:  Juror Use of Electronic 
Communications and Social Networking Tools, 15 No. 5 J. INTERNET L. 1, 1 
(2011) (“[A]s we enter the next decade of the 21st century, the ubiquity of 
instant electronic communication and mobile applications for social networking 
sites such as Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and LinkedIn allow jurors to research 
the issues in the cases for which they serve, as well as to immediately interact 
with others.”). 
8 Christopher B. Hopkins, Internet Social Networking Sites for Lawyers, 28 
TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 12, 12 (2009).  Some have offered more technical definitions.  
See, e.g., Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition, 
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMP.-MEDIATED COMM. 1 (2007), 
http://jcmc.indiana.edu/vol13/issue1/boyd.ellison.html (defining social 
networking as a web-based tool that permits a user to “(1) construct a public or 
semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users 
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of 
connections and those made by others within the system”). 
9 See, e.g., Lisa Hoover, How Social Media Has Changed Society, PC WORLD, 
Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.pcworld.com/article/162719/how_social_networking_ 
has_changed_society.html.  
10 STATE OF THE MEDIA: THE SOCIAL MEDIA REPORT, THE NIELSEN CO. 1 
(2011) [hereinafter NIELSEN REPORT] (further reporting that nearly 80% of all 
Internet users access social media websites). 
11 Karen North, Steve Jobs and the Rise of Social Media, CNN OPINION, Oct. 7, 
2011, available at http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/07/opinion/jobs-social-
media/index.html. 
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 Perhaps the most popular online social network is Facebook, a 
web-based “social utility that helps people communicate more efficiently 
with their friends, family and coworkers.”12  Facebook connects users by 
allowing them to “friend” each other, comment on other users’ “walls,” 
and post images and other media for the world to see.13  Founded in 
2004, Facebook currently has more than 800 million active users.14  Its 
growth statistics are staggering:15  
 
Date Number of Active Users Rate of Annual Growth  
December 2004 1,000,000 - - 
December 2005 6,000,000 600.00% 
December 2006 12,000,000 200.00% 
December 2007 58,000,000 483.33% 
December 2008 145,000,000 250.00% 
December 2009 360,000,000 248.28% 
December 2010 608,000,000 168.89% 
December 2011 845,000,000 138.98% 
 
 According to Facebook, each of its active users has an average of 
130 “Facebook friends,” and maintains an average of 80 connections to 
“community pages, groups, and events.”16  More than half of Facebook 
users access the service in any given day,17 and as of December of 2011, 
more than “425 million monthly active users accessed Facebook on a 
mobile device” such as an iPhone.18  Americans spend more time on 
Facebook than any other website.19  
  
 Despite its popularity, Facebook is far from the only significant 
social networking service available to the public.  Another example is 
Twitter.20  Launched in 2006, Twitter “is a social networking and micro-
blogging service” that, as one court described,  
                                                
12 Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAre 
aId=22 (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). 
13 Id. 
14 Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://newsroom.fb.com/content/default.aspx?NewsAre 
aId=20 (last visited Mar. 5, 2012). 
15 Id. 
16 Statistics, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/press/info.php (last visited 
Jan. 12, 2012). 
17 Id. 
18 Marguerite Reardon, Does Facebook Have a Mobile Problem?, CNET, Feb. 
2, 2012, http://news.cnet.com/8301-30686_3-57370105-266/does-facebook-
have-a-mobile-problem/. 
19 See NIELSEN REPORT, supra note 10, at 1. 
20 See Ebony Nicolas, A Practical Framework for Preventing “Mistrial by 
Twitter,” 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 385, 386 (2010) (“Twitter is a 
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invites its users to answer the question:  “What are you doing?”  
Twitter’s users can send and read electronic messages known as 
“tweets.”  A tweet is a short text post (up to 140 characters) 
delivered through Internet or phone-based text systems to the 
author’s subscribers.  Users can send and receive tweets in several 
ways, including via the Twitter website.21 
 
A user’s “Tweets” are public Internet postings for all to see (unless the 
user activates certain privacy settings).22  Although Twitter does not 
publish specific demographic data about its users, it appears that Twitter 
users, as a general group, “tend to value feeling connected to many 
people, exchanging information in a timely manner, and learning new 
things from and about other people.”23  
 
 Twitter, like Facebook, is growing at an astonishing rate.  In 
April of 2010, Twitter representatives reported at “Chirp,” the official 
Twitter developer conference, that new users were accessing Twitter at a 
rate of 300,000 per day.24  By March of 2011, Twitter had approximately 
200 million users.25  According to recent reports, Twitter users send 350 
billion Tweets each day,26 and the Twitter network has a “long-term goal 
of exceeding 1 billion active users.”27   
 
 Beyond Facebook and Twitter, still other social networking 
services command hundreds of millions of users.  A relatively new 
                                                                                                         
relatively new techno-social phenomenon that pushes the boundaries of 
traditional rules concerning juror misconduct and technology in the 
courtrooms[.]”). 
21 United States v. Shelnutt, No. 09-CR-14, 2009 WL 3681827, at *1 n.1 (M.D. 
Ga. Nov. 2, 2009). 
22 About Twitter, TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com/about (last visited Jan. 25, 
2012). 
23 Nicolas, supra note 20, at 378.   
24 Jason Kincaid, Twitter has 105,779,710 Registered Users, Adding 300K A 
Day, TECHCRUNCH, Apr. 14, 2010, http://techcrunch.com/2010/04/14/twitter-
has-105779710-registered-users-adding-300k-a-day; see also Twitter User 
Statistics REVEALED, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Mar. 23, 2011, 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/14/twitter-user-statistics-
r_n_537992.html.   
25 Charlie White, Reaching 200 Million Accounts: Twitter’s Explosive Growth, 
MASHABLE, July 17, 2011, http://mashable.com/2011/07/16/twitter-accounts-
200-million.  
26 Id.  
27 Michael Liedtke, Twitter Simplifies in Bid to Engage More Users, WASH. 
TIMES (Dec. 8, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/8/ 
twitter-simplifies-in-bid-to-engage-more-users/?page=all. 
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service, Google Plus, markets itself as a “real life sharing” platform, 
commanding more than 90 million users28 and counting.29  Tumblr, a 
blogging site that allows users to “effortlessly share anything,” contains 
over 40 million individual blogs, which have generated nearly 16 billion 
total posts.30  The professional networking website LinkedIn has 
approximately 135 million active users,31 and a rapidly growing 
community of users who “check in” and share their location with others 
via Foursquare, now numbers over 15 million.32 
 
II.  SOCIAL MEDIA USE BY JURORS 
 
A. Social Media and the Legal Profession 
 
 The legal profession is no stranger to social media.33  As one 
article recently observed, “jurors, judges, witnesses, clients and 
opponents all use social media, and so too must the savvy litigator, both 
to research and prepare their case[.]”34  Indeed, for better or worse, 
lawyers are frequently using social media to discover information about 
potential jurors,35 opposing counsel, and (less frequently) the judge 
                                                
28 Mark Milian, Google Says Social Network Has 90M Users, CNN, Jan. 19, 
2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/19/tech/social-media/google-plususers/inde 
x.html?c=tech. 
29 See Ted Thornhill, Google Plus “Will Have More Than 400m Users by the 
End of 2012” – Will it Overtake Facebook?, MAIL ONLINE (U.K) (Dec. 30, 
2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2080207/Google-Plus-hit-
400m-users--overtake-Facebook.html (noting that, with “625,000 members” 
joining each day, Google Plus “will have more than 400 million users by the end 
of 2012”). 
30 See About, TUMBLR, http://www.tumblr.com/about (last visited Feb. 26, 2012) 
(indicating that 16,484,811,994 total posts existed as of January 25, 2012). 
31 Jeff Weiner, 100 Million Members and Counting . . . , LINKEDIN BLOG, Mar. 
22, 2011, http://blog.linkedin.com/2011/03/22/linkedin-100-million.   
32 About Foursquare, FOURSQUARE, https://foursquare.com/about (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2012). 
33 See Helen W. Gunnarsson, Friending Your Enemies, Tweeting Your Trials; 
Using Social Media Ethically, 99 ILL. B.J. 500, 500–04 (2011) (discussing the 
rise of social media and its implications for the practice of law).  
34 Nicole D. Galli et al., Litigation Considerations Involving Social Media, 81 
PA. B.A. Q. 59, 59 (2010). 
35 See, e.g., Carino v. Muenzen, No. L-0028-07, 2010 WL 3448071, at *10 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 30, 2010) (per curiam) (holding that trial court erred 
in barring the parties from using the Internet during voir dire); Jamila A. 
Johnson, Voir Dire: To Google or Not to Google, ABA LAW TRENDS & NEWS 
(2008), available at http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law 
_trends_news_practice_area_e_newsletter_home/litigation_johnson.html (“[I]t 
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herself.36  Reporters have used services like Twitter to “live Tweet” from 
the courtroom,37 and federal and state courts are beginning to develop a 
social media presence.38   
 
B. Risks of Jurors’ Use of Social Media  
 
 Despite its potential benefits to the legal profession,39 the rise of 
web-based social networking services has “wreak[ed] havoc” in the jury 
box.40  This is particularly true where jurors have Tweeted, Facebook 
posted, blogged, or otherwise communicated about their jury service 
through social networking services during trial.41  The problem has not 
                                                                                                         
is apparent that the decision to Google or not to Google is not clear-cut.”).  
Research by Reuters Legal found that the practice of conducting extensive 
online searches about members of the prospective jury pool is becoming more 
commonplace, yet “lawyers are skittish about discussing the practice, in part 
because court rules on the subject are murky or nonexistent in most 
jurisdictions.”  Brian Grow, Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror, 
REUTERS, Feb. 17, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/ 
17/us-courts-voirdire-idUSTRE71G4VW20110217 (reporting that many law 
firms and jury consultants were reluctant to discuss their process of juror vetting 
because they “weren’t sure judges would approve”).  
36 See Galli, supra note 34, at 60–61 (noting that at least four federal appellate 
judges maintain social networking profiles, and suggesting that “[l]itigants 
should vet a judge’s social networking profile in advance of trial”) (citing 
Deborah Cassens Weiss, Dozens of Judges are Getting LinkedIn, Blogger Notes, 
ABA J., Aug. 20, 2009, available at http:www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
blogger_finds_dozens_of_judges_with_linkedin_profiles/). 
37 See, e.g., Michael Lindenberger, Twitter Moves to Federal Court, CITIZEN 
MEDIA LAW PROJECT BLOG, Mar. 2, 2009, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/ 
2009/twitter-moves-federal-court. 
38 Examples of courts on Twitter include the Illinois Supreme Court, the District 
of Columbia Courts, and the Indiana judiciary, to name just a few.  See DC 
Courts PIO, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/dccourtsinfo (last visited Feb. 26, 
2012); IL Supreme Court, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/illinoiscourts (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2012); Indiana Courts, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/#!/incourts 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
39 See Technology Brings Headaches, Help to Wash. Courtrooms, SEATTLE 
TIMES (Dec. 4, 2011), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2016935 
842_apwajurortechnology1stldwritethru.html (noting the use of iPads to track 
juror attendance and communication). 
40 John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials are Popping Up, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 18, 2009, at A1. 
41 Many will recall the 2009 incident in which television personality Al Roker 
Tweeted pictures of his jury service to his more than 20,000 followers on 
Twitter.  After being confronted by the court, and subjected to a barrage of 
criticism, Roker apologized, but clarified that he did not Tweet pictures of the 
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gone unnoticed.  In December of 2010, Reuters reported that the 
“explosion of blogging, tweeting and other online diversions has reached 
into U.S. jury boxes, raising serious questions about juror impartiality 
and the ability of judges to control courtrooms.”42  One year earlier, the 
New York Times similarly reported that the “use of BlackBerrys and 
iPhones by jurors gathering and sending out information about cases is . . 
. upending deliberations and infuriating judges.”43   
 
 As these news reports suggest, social networking by jurors 
during trial (whether at the courthouse or at home) carries with it a 
dangerous potential to undermine the fundamental fairness of trial 
proceedings.44  Our jury system rests on the principle that “conclusions 
to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in 
open court, and not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or 
public print.”45  This means, among other things, that jurors may discuss 
                                                                                                         
courtroom.  See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Media Atwitter Over Al Roker’s 
Twitter Photos from Jury Duty Wait, ABA J., May 29, 2009, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/media_atwitter_over_al_rokers_twitter
_photos_from_jury_duty_wait/ (describing Al Roker’s tweet of the jury lounge 
and negative reaction); Dareh Gregorian, Oh What a Twit!  Tweeting Roker 
Sorry for Taking Juror Pix, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 29, 2009, available at 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/regional/item_orPeW3RKHabFGbsbXOYCXI. 
42 Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go Off Track, REUTERS, Dec. 
9, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/12/08/us-internet-
jurors-idUSTRE6B74Z820101208 [hereinafter Grow]. 
43 Schwartz, supra note 40.   
44 See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (3d Cir. 2011) (discussing 
prejudice that may arise from jurors’ use of the Internet during trial); Caren 
Myers Morrison, Jury 2.0, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1579, 1590 (2011) (quoting 
statement of state supreme court justice that the Internet is “‘one of the biggest 
concerns that we have about fair trials in the future’”) (quoting Laura A. 
Bischoff, Courthouse Tweets Not So Sweet, Say Judges, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, 
Feb. 12, 2010, http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-
judges/13916591-1.html); Hon. Dennis Sweeney, Social Media and Jurors, 43 
MD. B.J., 44, 46 (Nov./Dec. 2010) (“While these new social media phenomena 
are very recent—for example Facebook was created in 2005 [sic] and Twitter in 
2006—they along with the older processes of e-mail messages and texting have 
already generated troubling issues for trial courts trying to assure fair trials for 
the parties before them.”); Steve Eder, Jurors’ Tweets Upend Trials, WALL ST. 
J. L. BLOG (Mar. 5, 2012, 8:10 PM), http://online.wsj.com 
/article/SB10001424052970204571404577255532262181656.html (“Courts are 
concerned about what users might say online, because it could be construed as 
having a bias about the case or reveal information about a trial or deliberations 
before they becomes public.”). 
45 Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Att’y Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907); see also 
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (“[A]ny private 
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the case only with each other—and even then, only during 
deliberations46—and that jurors must be “‘capable and willing to decide 
the case solely on the evidence’” presented at trial, free from any 
external influences.47  
  
 Judges have long confronted juror misconduct,48 but “the 
widespread use of social networking sites, such as Twitter and Facebook, 
[has] exponentially increased the risk of prejudicial communication 
amongst jurors and opportunity to exercise persuasion and influence 
upon jurors.”49  Social media allows jurors to communicate with an 
audience larger than ever before, and from the convenience of their 
iPhone, iPad, Blackberry, Android, or other mobile devices.50  As the 
Third Circuit has explained, “the risk of [a] prejudicial communication 
may be greater when a juror comments on a blog or social media website 
than when she has a discussion about the case in person, given that the 
universe of individuals who are able to see and respond to a comment on 
                                                                                                         
communication, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror during 
a trial about the matter pending before the jury is . . . deemed presumptively 
prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the 
instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full 
knowledge of the parties.”). 
46 See, e.g., United States v. Cox, 324 F.3d 77, 86 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where the 
district court instructs a jury to refrain from premature deliberations . . . and the 
jury nonetheless discusses the case before the close of trial, that premature 
deliberation may constitute juror misconduct.”). 
47 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 738 (1993) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 
455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)). 
48 See, e.g., Caren Myers Morrison, Can the Jury Survive Google, 25 CRIM. 
JUST. 4, 8 (2011) (discussing instances of jurors visiting a crime scene, 
conducting experiments, and seeking additional information). 
49 United States v. Juror No. One, No. 10-703, 2011 WL 6412039, at *6 (E.D. 
Pa. Dec. 21, 2011) (citing Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305); see also Morrison, supra 
note 48, at 11 (“The more people are linked through a complex of contacts, 
listservs, dating databases, and friend pages, the more these chance encounters 
become likely, causing not only the embarrassment of seeing trial participants in 
unexpected contexts, but also possible prejudice to the parties.”); Amanda 
McGee, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The Prevalence of the 
Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 301, 
307–08 (2010) (noting the evolution from traditional instances of investigating 
the crime scene or talking about the case with one’s spouse to more 
sophisticated means of Internet-based misconduct). 
50 Making mobile social media communications even more convenient, Apple 
recently integrated Twitter and other networking applications into its iPhone 
operating system, iOS 5.  See iOS 5: Features that Go Further, APPLE, 
http://www.apple.com/ios/features.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
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Facebook or a blog is significantly larger.”51  Knowing this risk, one can 
understand the multitude of problems that resulted from the juror who 
conducted a Facebook poll about how she should vote during 
deliberations.52 
 
 Given the nature of social networking, juror communication 
about a trial through social media involves a substantial risk that other 
users will respond, whether or not the juror intended others do so.  
Because these services allow users to respond to each other’s 
communications, even one-sided communications can become “very 
much public discussions”53—depending on “how others in the 
‘Twittersphere’ respond.”54  The Third Circuit recently addressed this 
concern:   
 
Not unlike a juror who speaks with friends or family members about 
a trial before the verdict is returned, a juror who comments about a 
case on the internet or social media may engender responses that 
include extraneous information about the case, or attempts to 
exercise persuasion and influence.55   
 
In the Third Circuit case, discussed in greater detail below, a juror on the 
eve of deliberations wrote a comment on Facebook stating that the juror 
was “not sure about tomorrow.”56  A Facebook friend of the juror 
responded, without invitation, by asking “why?” to which the juror 
responded, “think of the last five months dear.”57 
 
 Jurors’ social media communications additionally risk “chill[ing] 
robust discussion” in the jury room.58  If members of a jury become 
                                                
51 Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305.   
52 See, e.g., Guy Patrick, Juror Axed for Verdict Poll on Net, THE SUN (U.K.), 
Nov. 24, 2008, http://www.thesun.co.uk/sol/homepage/news/article1963544.ece 
(reporting that a court dismissed a juror who polled Facebook friends on a child 
sexual assault case) 
53 Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *15 (Ark. Dec. 
8, 2011). 
54 Nicolas, supra note 20, at 396. 
55 Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305. 
56 Id. at 298. 
57 Id. at 298 n.3. 
58 Morrison, supra note 48, at 9 (discussing the risk of “chill[ing] robust 
discussion inside the jury room” due to jurors’ fearing that their statements 
might end up on the Internet).  Cf. id. at 10 (“If the linchpin of the jury’s 
legitimacy is that its verdicts are opaque, so all mistakes are hidden from sight, 
the facts that increasing numbers of jurors are blogging, revealing the petty 
rivalries, potential misapprehension of evidence, and irrelevant matter they 
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aware that one of their own is publicly communicating about the trial, 
those jurors may question the secrecy of the deliberative process and the 
protections afforded their discussions.  As Justice Carzodo once wrote, 
“[f]reedom of debate might be stifled and independence of thought 
checked if jurors were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were 
to be freely published to the world.”59 
 
 Finally, apart from the significant potential for actual prejudice 
to the parties, juror communications about the trial through social media 
may undermine the public integrity of the judicial system. 60  Our system 
of justice “depends upon public confidence in the jury’s verdict,”61 and 
the unseemliness of jurors using Facebook or Twitter to discuss their jury 
service may spawn public doubt about the capacity of the modern jury 
system to achieve justice. 
 
C. Examples of Juror Misconduct 
  
 Recent events demonstrate the reality and severity of these 
risks.62  Consider the case of the Tweeting juror who sat on a capital jury 
                                                                                                         
actually considered may change the calculus that keeps jury decision making 
hidden.”). 
59 Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933). 
60 See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1997) (“It is 
well understood, for example, that disclosure of the substance of jury 
deliberations may undermine public confidence in the jury system[.]”) (citing 
Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARV. L. REV. 886, 889 
(1983)).  Cf. Johnson v. Duckworth, 650 F.2d 122, 125 (7th Cir. 1981) (“[I]f an 
intrusion into the jury’s privacy has, or is likely to have, the effect of stifling 
such debate, the defendant’s right to trial by jury may well have been 
violated.”). 
61 United States v. Siegelman, 640 F.3d 1159, 1186 (11th Cir. 2011); see also 
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that plain error occurs when an error seriously 
affects “‘the integrity of public reputation of the judicial proceedings’”) (quoting 
United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936)); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 
U.S. 466, 472 (1965) (discussing and emphasizing the “fundamental integrity of 
all that is embraced in the constitutional concept of trial by jury”). 
62 See, e.g., Eder, supra note 44 (reporting a specific example of juror 
misconduct on Twitter to "show how the use of social media is disrupting the 
jury trial"); Jeannie Nuss, Death Row Inmate Gets New Trial Because of Tweet, 
HOUSTON CHRON. (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/art icle/Death-
row-inmate-gets-new-trial-because-of-tweet-2388661.php (reporting that the 
state high court ordered a new trial in a capital case after a juror tweeted about 
deliberations); Tweets Cause US Death Tow Conviction to be Overturned, BBC 
(U.K.), Dec. 9, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16108000. 
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in Arkansas.  In Dimas-Martinez v. State,63 the Arkansas Supreme Court 
considered the effect of a juror’s mid-trial Tweets in a criminal case that 
resulted in a death sentence.  The juror’s Tweets included comments 
such as “Choices to be made.  Hearts to be broken.  We each define the 
great line.”64  Counsel alerted the trial judge to the Tweets, and the juror 
admitted to his misconduct.  The trial judge admonished the juror to stop 
Tweeting, but did not remove the juror, who subsequently continued to 
Tweet.   
 
 The jury returned a verdict of guilty, upon which the trial court 
imposed a sentence of death.65  The trial court denied the defendant’s 
motion for a new trial.  On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
reversed, explaining: 
 
[T]his court has recognized the importance that jurors not be 
allowed to post musings, thoughts, or any other information about 
trials on any online forums. The possibility for prejudice is simply 
too high. Such a fact is underscored in this case . . . because one of 
the juror’s Twitter followers was a reporter.  Thus, the media had 
advance notice that the jury had completed its sentencing 
deliberations before an official announcement was made to the 
court.  This is simply unacceptable, and the circuit court’s failure to 
acknowledge this juror’s inability to follow the court’s directions 
was an abuse of discretion.66 
 
 Similar examples abound.  Jurors have used Facebook to 
“friend” parties, including criminal defendants,67 witnesses, lawyers, and 
even each other during trial.68  Others have broadcasted disparaging 
                                                
63 Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *12 (Ark. Dec. 
8, 2011). 
64 Id.  
65 Id. at *1. 
66 Id. at *16–17.  
67 See Ben Zimmer, Juror Could Face Jail Time for ‘Friending’ Defendant, 
USA TODAY (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-
02-07/juror-facebook-friend-defendant/53000186/1 (reporting on a contempt-of-
court hearing for a juror who asked to be Facebook friends with the defendant). 
68 MEGHAN DUNN, JURORS USE OF SOCIAL MEDIA DURING TRIALS AND 
DELIBERATIONS: A REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON 
COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT 3–4 (Fed. Judicial Ctr., ed., 
Nov. 22, 2011) [hereinafter FJC REPORT]; see also Facebook Request Gets Man 
Kicked off Jury, HERALD-TRIBUNE (Sarasota, Fla.) (Dec. 30, 2011), 
http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/11/online-and-wired-for-justice-why-jurors-
turn-to-the-internet-the-google-mistrial; Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich, 
Online and Wired for Justice: Why Jurors Turn to the Internet, THE JURY 
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comments about other jurors—like the California juror who posted on 
Facebook that she “want[ed] to punch” a fellow juror for cracking her 
knuckles.69  Still other jurors have offered their opinions relating to guilt 
or innocence,70 including the juror who posted on Facebook that the 
defendant was “presumed guilty,”71 and the prospective juror in the 
Chandra Levy murder trial who Tweeted, “[g]uilty, guilty . . . I will not 
be swayed.  Practicing for jury duty.”72  The juror’s conduct in the Levy 
case is particularly disconcerting because, as the juror later explained, he 
had “merely tweeted out of habit.”73  
 
 In another California case, a juror commented on her Facebook 
page that “the case just keeps getting weirder” after the defendant was 
temporarily quarantined in jail due to a swine flu outbreak.74  A 
Connecticut juror wrote on Facebook that jury duty was “boring,” and 
pleaded for “[s]omebody [to] get me outta here.”75  That same juror 
announced “Guilty :)” on her Facebook page on the day of the verdict.76  
  
                                                                                                         
EXPERT, Nov. 1, 2009, http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/11/online-and-
wired-for-justice-why-jurors-turn-to-the-internet-the-google-mistrial.  For cases 
related to this issue, see Juror No. One v. California, No. CIV. 2:11-397 WBS 
JFM, 2011 WL 567356, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2011) (communication 
between jurors through Facebook during trial); People v. Rios, No. 1200/06, 
2010 WL 625221, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 23, 2010) (communication between 
jurors and witnesses); Wilgus v. F/V Sirius, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 23, 26 (D. Me. 
2009) (juror emailed counsel). Cf. United States v. Forde, 407 Fed. App’x 740, 
747 (4th Cir. 2011) (considering allegation of juror misconduct on account of 
social media activity by a friend of the juror’s spouse).   
69 Facebooking Juror Kicked Off Murder Trial, THE ORANGE COUNTY REG. 
(Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/juror-329708-trial-
judge.html. Even a prosecutor’s Facebook posts have been called into question. 
See State v. Usee, 800 N.W.2d 192, 200 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (questioning a 
prosecutor’s decision to post publicly on his Facebook account regarding trial-
related issues). 
70 FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 4 (noting that one juror contacted the 
plaintiff’s former employee to reveal the likely verdict). 
71 Facebooking Juror Kicked Off Murder Trial, supra note 69. 
72 Prospective Juror Tweets Self Out of Levy Murder Trial, NBC WASHINGTON, 
Oct. 22, 2010, http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Prospective-Juror-
Tweets-Self-Out-of-Levy-Murder-Trial-105553253.html.   
73 Id.  
74 People v. Turner, No. G042598, 2011 WL 579210, at *6 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 
Feb. 18, 2011). 
75 United States v. Ganias, No. 08-CR-224, 2011 WL 4738684, at *3 (D. Conn. 
Oct. 5, 2011).   
76 Id. 
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 In a widely reported and particularly egregious case in Illinois, a 
juror frequently, after leaving the courtroom, “logged into her blog and 
wrote an entry describing the dialogue that took place in the jury room 
that day.”77  Her blog posts included information about the demographics 
of the jury,78 the identity of the witnesses at trial,79 and the weight of the 
evidence at trial.80  
 
 The high-profile federal corruption trial of former Pennsylvania 
State Senator, Vincent Fumo, sheds further light on the problems 
surrounding jurors’ use of social media during federal trials. In United 
States v. Fumo,81 prosecutors charged Fumo with numerous counts of 
mail and wire fraud, tax evasion, and obstruction of justice, arising out of 
Fumo’s activities while in public office.82  Jury selection took place 
between September 8 and October 20, 2008, and the ensuing trial “lasted 
an additional five months.”83  On March 16, 2009, “after four days of 
deliberation,” the jury returned verdicts of guilty against Fumo on all 
counts.84  
 
 During deliberations, on March 15, 2009, “a local television 
station reported that one of the jurors [(“Juror 1”)] had made postings on 
both his Facebook and Twitter pages related to the trial.”85  The comment 
reported by the media was the juror’s “single comment or ‘tweet’ on 
March 13, stating[,] ‘This is it . . . no looking back now!’”86  When Juror 
1 heard the television report that night, he “panicked and deleted the 
comments from his Facebook page.”87  The parties subsequently learned 
that “Juror 1’s Facebook comments appeared over the many months of 
                                                
77 Keith Ecker, Juror Use of Social Media, Blogs Compromises Cases, 
LAWYERS.COM, Dec. 2, 2011, http://blogs.lawyers.com/2011/12/juror-use-of-
social-media-blogs-compromises-cases. 
78 Id. (“So our jury consists of a fireman, a dressmaker, a bar manager, a guy 
who just finished college, two office managers, a special education teacher, a 
trade, a freelance writer (me!), and five others, including two alternatives . . . . 
We have ten woman and four men; ten white and four black.”). 
79 Id. (“The last witness for the plaintiff was the plaintiff herself, the widow of 
the allegedly wrongfully dead guy.”).   
80 Id. (“At times during [the plaintiff’s] testimony, there were tears rolling down 
the face of the juror sitting in front of me, and I don’t think she was alone.  
Sympathy won’t win their case—but it sure doesn’t hurt.”). 
81 United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288 (3d Cir. 2011).  
82 Id. at 296–97. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 297. 
85 Id. at 298.   
86 Id.  
87 Id. 
16 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW [Vol. 11 
the trial,”88 and included the following, as summarized by the Third 
Circuit: 
 
Sept. 18: (apparently upon a continuance of the trial due to judge’s 
illness):  “[Juror 1] is glad he got a 5 week reprieve, but still could 
use the money . . . .” 
 
Jan. 11: (apparently referring to the end of the government’s case):  
“[Juror 1] is wondering if this could be the week to end Part 1?” 
 
Jan. 21:  “[Juror 1] wonders if today will really be the end of Part 1? 
? ?” 
 
Mar. 4: (conclusion of closing arguments):  “[Juror 1] can’t believe 
tomorrow may actually be the end!!!”  A friend responded to the 
March 4 Facebook post by asking “of what?”  Juror 1 responded:  
“Can’t say till tomorrow!  LOL.”  
 
Mar. 8:  (Sunday evening before second day of deliberations): 
“[Juror 1] is not sure about tomorrow . . . .”  A friend responded to 
the March 8 Facebook post by asking “Why?” Juror 1 responded:  
“think of the last 5 months dear.”  
 
Mar. 9:  (end of second day of deliberations):  “[Juror 1] says today 
was much better than expected and tomorrow looks promising too!” 
 
Mar. 13:  (Friday after completion of first week of deliberations):  
“Stay tuned for the big announcement on Monday everyone!”89 
 
 Upon learning of these comments, the district court questioned 
the juror “about his activities on these two websites and his general 
media consumption.”90  Juror 1 responded that he “had avoided 
television news during the entire trial[, and] had not discussed the 
substance of the case with anyone.”91  Crediting the juror’s responses, the 
district court “determined that there was no evidence that Juror 1 
received outside influence due to his Facebook or Twitter postings and 
concluded” that the postings “were ‘nothing more than harmless 
ramblings having no prejudicial effect.  They were so vague as to be 
                                                
88 Id. 
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id. at 299 (“Juror 1 further stated that he had made the comments ‘for my 
benefit to just get it out of my head, similar to a blog posting or somebody 
journaling something.’”) (internal record citation omitted). 
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virtually meaningless.’”92  The trial court subsequently denied Fumo’s 
request for a new trial, and Fumo appealed on the basis of juror 
misconduct.93   
 
 The Third Circuit affirmed.94  The court began by 
acknowledging the specific risks that arise when jurors communicate 
about a trial through social media,95 and in that regard, “enthusiastically 
endorse[d]” the model social media instructions proposed by the United 
States Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management (“CACM”).96  In reviewing the decision below, however, 
the Third Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s 
refusal to grant a new trial.97  The court “largely agreed” with the district 
court’s characterization of Juror 1’s communications as “meaningless,” 
and explained that Fumo failed to advance any plausible argument that 
the comments “have led to substantial prejudice against him.”98 
 
III.  MINIMIZING THE RISKS OF SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
A. Response from the Bench 
 
 Courts have responded to the challenges of social media use by 
jurors in a variety of ways.99  In October of 2011, the Federal Judicial 
Center (“FJC”) sent a questionnaire to all active and senior federal 
district court judges in order to “assess the frequency with which jurors 
use social media to communicate about cases during trial and 
                                                
92 Id.  Although less instructive for our purposes, Fumo later filed a second 
motion for a new trial, presenting evidence that, on the day of the verdict, “all of 
the jurors had heard media reports about Juror 1’s use of Facebook and Twitter.”  
Id.  The district court rejected this argument without a hearing, and the Third 
Circuit found no error in declining to investigate this alleged misconduct.  Id. at 
299, 304–08. 
93 Id. at 302.  Fumo appealed on other grounds as well, but we limit our 
discussion to the issue of the Facebooking juror.  
94 Id. at 294.   
95 Id. at 304–05. 
96 Id.  For a discussion of the CACM model instruction, see infra notes 104-107 
and accompanying text.  
97 Id. at 307. 
98 Id. at 306. 
99 The challenges of social media communications do not present themselves 
only to courts in the United States.  Courts in other countries are grappling with 
these same issues.  See, e.g., Juror Faces Contempt Proceedings Over ‘Case 
Research,’ BBC (U.K.), Nov. 29, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
15939922 (discussing jurors in the United Kingdom conducting trial-related 
research on the Internet).   
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deliberation,”100 and “to identify strategies judges have found to be 
effective and appropriate in curbing this behavior.”101  More than 500 
judges responded, and according to the FJC, “most judges have taken 
steps to ensure that jurors do not use social media in the courtroom.”102  
Only 6% of respondents, or 30 judges, reported that “they have not 
specifically addressed jurors’ use of social media.”103 
 
 The “great majority of judges” reported having taken affirmative 
steps toward risk reduction.  These steps differed depending on the 
judge, but most of the judges reported that they employ a social media 
jury instruction.104  Sixty percent of these judges use the CACM model 
instruction, which reads as follows:   
 
[Before Trial:] . . . . Until you retire to deliberate, you may not 
discuss this case with anyone, even your fellow jurors.  After you 
retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the case with your 
fellow jurors, but you cannot discuss the case with anyone else until 
you have returned a verdict and the case is at an end.  I hope that for 
all of you this case is interesting and noteworthy.  I know that many 
of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet and other tools of 
technology.  You also must not talk to anyone about this case or use 
these tools to communicate electronically with anyone about the 
case.  This includes your family and friends.  You may not 
communicate with anyone about the case on your cell phone, 
through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, 
through any blog or website, through any internet chat room, or by 
way of any other social networking websites, including Facebook, 
My Space, Linkedin, and YouTube. 
 
                                                
100 FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 1. 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  The judiciary is not the only stakeholder that has responded to the risks of 
social media use by jurors to trials.  Some members of the bar, like Texas 
attorney Jason Casell, suggest that trial attorneys, in addition to requesting that 
the court take action, employ “passive online monitoring,” through searchable 
databases, to detect juror misconduct on the Internet.  See Casell, supra note 7, 
at 18 (“It is recommended that attorneys monitor social networking activity 
throughout the trial and up to the verdict by searching sites such as Facebook, 
Twitter, and MySpace; conducting general Internet searches; and establishing 
email alerts for key search terms.”).   
103 FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 5. 
104 See id. at 6 (noting that 60% of judges surveyed in a study reported that they 
“have actually used the model [social media] jury instructions during a trial”); 
Nicolas, supra note 20, at 387–93 (discussing various forms of a social media 
instruction). 
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[At the Close of the Case:]  During your deliberations, you must not 
communicate with or provide any information to anyone by any 
means about this case.  You may not use any electronic device or 
media, such as a telephone, cell phone, smart phone, iPhone, 
Blackberry or computer; the internet, any internet service, or any 
text or instant messaging service; or any internet chat room, blog, or 
website such as Facebook, My Space, Linkedin, YouTube or 
Twitter, to communicate to anyone any information about this case 
or to conduct any research about this case until I accept your 
verdict.105 
 
CACM transmitted these model instructions to every federal district 
court judge.106 As described above, the Third Circuit recently 
“enthusiastically endorse[d]” these instructions, and “strongly 
encourage[d] district courts to routinely incorporate them or similar 
language into their own instructions.”107 
 
 Beyond jury instructions, some courts have taken “additional 
measures . . . to prevent jurors from using social media during trials and 
deliberations.”108  These less common methods include courthouse 
technology bans,109 threats of contempt,110 and requiring jurors to sign 
written pledges not to communicate about the case through social 
                                                
105 United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 305 (quoting JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
COMMITTEE ON COURT ADMINISTRATION AND CASE MANAGEMENT, PROPOSED 
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO 
CONDUCT RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE (Dec. 
2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DIR10-
018-Attachment.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) [hereinafter CACM MODEL 
INSTRUCTION]). 
106 Memorandum from Judge Julie A. Robinson, Chair of the Judicial 
Conference Comm. on Court Admin. and Case Mgmt. to the Judges of the 
United States District Courts (Jan. 29, 2010), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2010/docs/DIR10-018.pdf. 
107 Fumo, 655 F.3d at 305. 
108 See FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 7–8 (listing eleven measures judges have 
taken to ensure that jurors do not use social media to communicate about a 
case). 
109 Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *17 (Ark. Dec. 
8, 2011) (observing “the wide array of possible juror misconduct that might 
result when jurors have unrestricted access to their mobile phones during a trial.  
Most mobile phones now allow instant access to a [sic] myriad of 
information.”).   
110 For at least some judges, contempt is not an empty threat.  See United States 
v. Juror No. One, No. 10-703, 2011 WL 6412039, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2011) 
(finding juror guilty of criminal contempt for violation of court’s instructions 
regarding email communications). 
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media.111  With regard to written pledges, the American College of Trial 
Lawyers has proposed the following “Statement of Compliance” for 
jurors to sign:112 
 
I agree that during the duration of the trial in _________________, 
I will not conduct any independent research into any of the issues or 
parties involved in this trial.  I will not communicate with anyone 
about the issues or parties in this trial, and I will not permit anyone 
to communicate with me.  I further agree that I will report any 
violations of the court’s instructions immediately. 
__________________________________ 
JUROR No. _____ 
 
B. Informal Survey Results  
 
 Against this background, we set out to learn more about jurors’ 
use of social networking during trial.  Over the past sixteen months, 
actual jurors were asked to complete a short survey at the conclusion of 
their jury service.  The survey asked the following questions regarding 
the use of social media:   
 
Were you tempted to communicate about the case through any 
social networks, such as Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, YouTube 
or Twitter? 
 
If so, what prevented you from doing so?113   
 
                                                
111 FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at 8.  This was U.S. District Court Judge Shira 
Scheindlin’s approach in an arms trafficking prosecution of a former Soviet 
military officer.  NY Judge: No Web for Jurors at Society Arms Trial, YAHOO 
NEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/ny-judge-no-jurors-soviet-arms-
trial-025047790.html.  The pledge stated, in relevant part:  “I agree to follow all 
of the Court’s preliminary instructions, including the Court’s specific 
instructions relating to Internet use and communication with others about the 
case. . . . I agree not to communicate with anyone about the issues or parties in 
this trial, and I will not permit anyone to communicate with me.”  Jeffrey T. 
Frederick, What is it About ‘Don’t Twitter’ You Do Not Understand?, JURY 
RESEARCH BLOG, Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.nlrg.com/blogs/jury-
research/bid/72541/What-Is-It-About-Don-t-Twitter-You-Do-Not-Understand. 
112 JURY COMMITTEE, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS CAUTIONING AGAINST USE OF THE INTERNET AND SOCIAL 
NETWORKING 1, 6 (Sept. 2010) [hereinafter ACTL MODEL INSTRUCTION]. 
113 Jury Questionnaire (2010–12) (unpublished research) (on file with the Duke 
Law and Technology Review).   
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 Approximately 140 jurors participated, representing jurors from 
sixteen criminal and civil trials in the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois.  All of the jurors sat in cases over which 
either Judge Amy J. St. Eve or Judge Matthew F. Kennelly presided.  In 
each of these cases, the District Judge employed a model social media 
instruction during opening and closing instructions.  Additionally, in 
many of the longer trials, the District Judge admonished the jury daily 
not to communicate about the case through social media. 
 
 Before discussing the results, a brief comment on methodology.  
We acknowledge that the informal survey is not scientific.  (We expect a 
Daubert challenge from some in the blogosphere.)114  We additionally 
acknowledge that although juror participation was voluntary and 
anonymous, some jurors may not have been completely candid, for any 
number of reasons.  Limitations of this type are not unusual.115 
 
 Cognizant of these limitations, we believe that the responses 
from actual jurors will assist the judiciary and the legal profession in 
developing best practices to ensure a fair trial in the face of social 
networking.  As we explain in more detail below, our key takeaway from 
the informal survey is that courts should routinely and frequently instruct 
jurors not to communicate about the case through social networking 
services, because jurors tend to follow the judge’s social media 
instructions.     
 
 Of the approximately 140 jurors who participated in the informal 
survey, only six jurors reported any temptation to communicate about the 
case through social media.  One juror stated that she “did want to 
research the case,” another stated simply, “Google,” and the four 
remaining jurors did not explain the nature of their temptation.  Each of 
the six jurors, however, reported that he or she did not ultimately 
succumb.   
 
 The juror tempted to use Google did not ultimately do so, 
explaining that she wanted “to keep an open mind.”  The juror who 
wanted “to research the case” stated clearly that she did not do so, 
without additional explanation.  Jury instructions appear to have had 
significant impact on the four other jurors.  Each of these jurors referred 
to either the judge’s instructions or the obligations of a juror as the 
                                                
114 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 580 (1993) (holding 
that a district court has discretion to exclude expert testimony that is not 
scientifically reliable). 
115 See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 48, at 7 (noting that reports of misconduct 
might under-represent the problem). 
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reason for their refrain.  Specifically, in response to the survey question 
about what “prevented you” from using social media, the four jurors 
stated, respectively:   
 
• “the judge” 
• “direct orders” 
• “I morally thought I should obey the judge” 
• “swore not to” 
 
 In contrast to the six jurors who were tempted by social media, 
the overwhelming majority of jurors—approximately 130 jurors, or 92% 
of the sample—reported no such temptation.  Some of the jurors were 
emphatic about this, stating:   
 
• “absolutely not” 
• “not at all” (two responses)  
• “NOT AT ALL” (was this juror yelling at us?!116) 
 
 Although most of the jurors responded, simply, “no,” when 
asked if they were tempted to use social media to communicate about the 
trial, numerous jurors offered further explanation, most often touching 
upon the judge’s social media instructions.  These jurors’ explanations 
included:  
 
• “the Judge’s instructions” 
• “the Judge” 
• “your instructions” 
• “the law” 
• “because the judge instructed us” 
• “was instructed not to do it” 
• “ordered not to look” 
• “the fact that we were not supposed to” 
• “stay true to my given orders” 
                                                
116 See Mark Simpson, Tech Etiquette is Just Common Sense, 7 COMMON 
GROUND J., No. 2, 81, 85 (2010) (“TYPING IN ALL CAPS IS CONSIDERED 
YELLING in electronic environments”).   
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• “I was sworn not to say anything” 
• “direct orders” 
• “your instructions made it clear” 
• “jury instructions” 
 
 Other jurors referenced principles of fairness, which may have 
related to the jury instructions, or arisen from the juror’s pre-existing 
notions of fairness.  Either way, these jurors explained their forbearance 
like this:  
 
• “it would not be fair” 
• “morally” 
• “didn’t want to sway my opinion” 
 
 For another juror, refraining from prohibited social media 
communications was a matter of personal pride, relating to her basic 
obligation not to discuss the case before deliberations.  This juror wrote: 
 
• “I was proud of the fact that we, as a jury, did not discuss the 
case until it came time for deliberations.”   
 
The juror’s specific pride is consistent with the general pride that other 
jurors felt through their participation in the process as a whole:   
 
• “made me feel like I am doing something good” 
• “feeling of citizenship for participation” 
• “great American experience & privilege” 
 
 Many jurors explained that they did not use or had no interest in 
using social networking services.  Despite the growing importance of 
social media and the Internet, these responses are an important reminder 
that not every juror uses Facebook or Twitter.  In the words of these 
jurors: 
 
•  “not big on technology” 
•  “don’t use any of those” 
•  “not on social networks” 
•  “I don’t use that too much” 
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•  “I don’t ‘social network’ anyway” 
•  “don’t use those elect. gadgets” 
•  “I don’t use social networks much” 
•  “not on social networks” 
•  “do not like” 
•  “not interested” 
•  “didn’t want to” 
 
 Finally, we highlight a handful of unique responses.  One juror 
lamented, with a smiley face, that she “came home too late” to even 
“think about Facebook :).”  Another juror, in an apparent reference to the 
substance of the trial, wrote that if she had violated the judge’s 
instructions, she “would be no better than the police officers for not 
following procedures.”  Although insisting she did not communicate 
about the case through social media, another juror stated that “nothing” 
could prevent her from doing so if she had wanted to.  Finally, one juror 
wrote “jail” as the reason she did not communicate about the case, 
presumably in a reference to being held in contempt.  While none of the 
jurors were advised about the risk of contempt, the contempt authority of 
a trial court may well be a matter of general knowledge.117 
 
C. Benefits of Social Media Instructions  
 
 Taken together, these informal findings strongly suggest that 
social media instructions effectively mitigate the risks of juror 
misconduct associated with social media.118  The overwhelming majority 
of the jurors—each of whom heard numerous social media instructions—
reported no temptation to communicate about the case through social 
media.  A significant number referenced the judge or the judge’s 
instructions as the reason that they did not so communicate.  Even as to 
the small minority of jurors who reported some temptation, all but one 
explained that the judge’s instructions or the juror’s general obligations 
                                                
117 See, e.g., Sandy Fitzgerald, Juror Booted for Facebook-Friending Defendant, 
MOBILEDIA, Jan. 3, 2012, http://www.mobiledia.com/news/122346.html 
(“judges are starting to crack down, threatening jurors with contempt of court 
charges if they insist on giving constant updates or contacting defendants”).   
118 This appears to be the growing consensus among federal judges.  See FJC 
REPORT, supra note 68, at 1, 5 (“[M]ost judges have taken steps to ensure jurors 
do not use social media in the courtroom. The most common strategy is 
incorporating social media use into the jury instructions[.]”).  
No. 1] ENSURING AN IMPARTIAL JURY 25 
to the court prevented them from acting on that temptation.  It is also 
significant that jurors remembered the judges’ social media instructions, 
as this suggests that the instructions made impressions on the jurors.  
  
 Consistent with these informal findings, influential entities like 
the Federal Judicial Center have recognized social media instructions as 
a non-invasive and highly effective practice.119  Courts have great 
familiarity with instructing juries, and have traditionally relied on jury 
instructions as the primary method of combating juror misconduct and 
ensuring a fair trial.120  Employing social media instructions in this 
context not only treats jurors with respect,121 but also is consistent with 
the long-standing presumption that jurors will follow a judge’s 
instructions.122   
 
 Courts need not resort immediately to draconian solutions such 
as blanket technology bans123 or throwing jurors in jail,124 either of which 
                                                
119 See id. at 6 (“[T]he model jury instructions appear to successfully affect 
jurors’ use of social media during at trial or deliberation.”). 
120 See McGee, supra note 49, at 310 (suggesting that the threat of social 
networking to the jury is an old problem with a new face).   
121 In the informal survey, one juror remarked favorably in her comments that 
she was “treated . . . respectfully by the Judge.”   
122 See Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 234 (2000) (“A jury is presumed to 
follow its instructions.”); see also Martin v. Royse, No. 1:08-CV-246, 2010 WL 
2521063, at *5 (N.D. Ind. June 11, 2010) (rejecting allegation of juror 
misconduct on account of alleged Tweets, reasoning that the court instructed the 
jury not to communicate about the case on Twitter, and that the juror was 
presumed to have followed that instruction).   
123 See Tresa Baldas, For Jurors in Michigan, No Tweeting (or Texting, or 
Googling) Allowed, THE NAT’L. L.J. (July 1, 2009), 
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431952628&slreturn=1 
(noting not only that Michigan courts have banned all electronic communication 
from the jury box, but also that courts in Ramsey County, Minnesota and 
Malheur County, Oregon have banned wireless handheld devices from court).  
In any event, case law suggests that jurors are more likely to commit misconduct 
on their own time, while not under the watchful eye of their fellow jurors or 
courthouse personnel.  See Mendoza v. Yarbrough, No. CVF035004DLBHC, 
2005 WL 1336544, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2005) (involving a juror who went 
home, researched the internet and used a dictionary to determine the meaning of 
“constructive possession” and “circumstantial evidence”).  For this and other 
reasons, blanket bans on technology in the courthouse may have only limited 
utility. 
124 See, e.g., Grow, Juror Could Face Charges for Online Research, REUTERS, 
Jan. 19, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/19/us-
internet-juror-idUSTRE70I5KI20110119 (indicating that a judge considered 
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may impact jurors’ willingness to serve.125  Just as judges did not force 
jurors to unplug their televisions or turn off their Satellite radios as those 
technologies developed, so should be the general attitude of judges as it 
relates to social networking.  A social media instruction may not prevent 
every instance of juror misconduct on Facebook, Twitter, or otherwise, 
and the unique circumstances of some trials might require additional 
measures and protections.  It has become clear, however, that a social 
media instruction is a necessary and often independently sufficient 
method for courts to minimize—if not eliminate—the risk of juror 
misconduct through social media. 
 
D. Crafting Social Media Instructions  
 After resolving to employ a social media instruction, judges must 
consider when to instruct, and how to instruct.  As to timing, courts 
should instruct juries early and often.  We suggest an instruction in the 
judge’s opening remarks to the jury, as a part of the judge’s closing 
instructions before the jury begins deliberations, and at reasonable 
intervals during trial, particularly those spanning many days.   
 
 With regard to content, a good place to start is with the 
numerous model social media instructions advanced by entities including 
CACM and the American College of Trial Lawyers.126  Many have 
offered extensive guidance on the appropriate content of a social media 
instruction, so we treat that issue only briefly.   
 
 The instruction should be specific.127 Although standard jury 
instructions prohibit jurors from discussing or communicating about the 
                                                                                                         
bringing criminal contempt charges against a juror, who had conducted online 
research and offered to share her research with other jurors). 
125 See, e.g., In re Adams, 421 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (“The 
courts expect a lot of jurors. They are not professionals but amateurs, brought 
out of the security of their homes and their jobs and placed in a position that is 
strange to them, in an environment that is at once austere, forbidding and at 
times frightening.  It is not always possible to give them information as to why 
certain things are happening because of the need to protect the decisional 
process.  Jurors are to be forever thanked for their willingness to serve in this 
most important aspect of judicial administration.  Judges and lawyers must make 
certain that jurors are protected.”). 
126 ACTL MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 112; CACM MODEL INSTRUCTION, 
supra note 105; see also FJC REPORT, supra note 68, at app. C-I (listing 
instructions from individual judges). 
127 An interesting issue arises when a court instructs jurors what not to search on 
the Internet.  Compare King v. Grams, No. 05-C-928, 2006 WL 1598679, at *4 
(E.D. Wis. June 2, 2006) (denying habeas corpus where petitioner argued that 
No. 1] ENSURING AN IMPARTIAL JURY 27 
case,128 the magnitude of social change occasioned by social media 
underscores the need for additional specificity.129  Americans have 
become “accustomed to their always-online lifestyle,”130 and for some, 
“tweeting and blogging are simply an extension of thinking, rather than a 
form of written communication.”131  As the Tweeting juror in the 
Chandra Levy trial explained, he had “merely tweeted out of habit.”132 
 
 For these reasons, an effective instruction should include more 
than “don’t Twitter anybody about this case”133 or “[w]e don’t want any 
tweeting or texting.”134  The instruction should instead specifically 
                                                                                                         
“by telling the jury not to do internet searches to find out background 
information about the defendant or the victim in the case on sites like ‘Google,’ 
the judge created the impression that [defendant-petitioner] did in fact have a 
criminal background to search for”), with United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 
127, 169–70 (2d Cir. 2011) (suggesting that specific leading question into 
juror’s potential exposure to extrinsic information “might itself have ‘create[d] 
prejudice’ by implying that a broader search could yield further information” 
about the defendant).  This issue is beyond the scope of the Article, and we 
simply observe that although it may be effective to provide specific examples of 
websites, behaviors, and devices that are prohibited, the potential risks of 
specifically instructing jurors what not to search on the Internet may outweigh 
the benefits of such an instruction.  
128 See, e.g., THE COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE 
SEVENTH CIRCUIT, FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH 
CIRCUIT 44 (2009 rev.) (pattern jury instruction:  “you are not to discuss this 
case with anyone”). 
129 See State of Vermont v. Abdi, No. 2010-255, 2012 WL 231555, ¶ 25 (Vt. 
Jan. 26, 2012) (“Although Vermont trial courts routinely admonish jurors not to 
consult outside sources, it may well be time to consider a stronger and more 
technology-specific admonition . . . . We cannot ignore the realities of our 
‘information age,’ where the Internet and other technologies have made 
information more widely and immediately accessible than ever before.”); 
Nicolas, supra note 20, at 395 (“Boilerplate instructions do not seem to go far 
enough anymore.”). 
130 See, e.g., Grow, supra note 42.  
131 Paula Hannaford-Agor, Jury News: Google Mistrials, Twittering Jurors, 
Juror Blogs, and Other Technological Hazards, 24 THE COURT MANAGER, No. 
2, at 43, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/cjs/JuryNews 
2009Vol24No2.pdf. 
132 Prospective Juror Tweets Self Out of Levy Murder Trial, supra note 72. 
133 Dimas-Martinez v. State, No. CR 11-5, 2011 WL 6091330, at *15 (Ark. Dec. 
8, 2011). 
134 Facebooking Juror Kicked Off Murder Trial, supra note 69 (juror posted 
Facebook comments, even after trial judge “warned her and all of the other 
jurors, as he always does, that they are not to do any independent investigation, 
consult any reference material, such as a dictionary, or talk about the case with 
anyone else, until deliberations begin . . . . and the biggest evil facing the world 
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enumerate the most popular social networking services such as 
Facebook, Twitter, and so on, that jurors may use—and have used—to 
commit misconduct.  Consider the model instruction by CACM:  
  
. . . . You may not communicate with anyone about the case on your 
cell phone, through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or 
on Twitter, through any blog or website, through any internet chat 
room, or by way of any other social networking websites, including 
Facebook, My Space, LinkedIn, and YouTube. . . .135 
 
 An effective social media instruction should also explain itself.  
As one judge has remarked:  “If jurors are going to be asked to sacrifice 
some of their personal freedom and forego their case-specific e-mailing, 
texting, blogging, instant messaging, and social networking for the 
duration of their service, they are entitled to a clear and thoughtful 
explanation of the reason.”136  The American College of Trial Lawyers 
seeks to address this concern in its model instruction by explaining the 
need for “a fair trial based on the evidence” presented in court.137  The 
instruction explains that outside information “might be inaccurate or 
incomplete, or for some other reason not applicable to this case, and the 
parties would not have a chance to explain or contradict that information 
because they wouldn’t know about it.”138  The instruction further 
explains that “[a]ny juror who violates [the court’s social media] 
restrictions . . . jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and a 
mistrial could result that would require the entire trial process to start 
over[, which would create a] tremendous expense and inconvenience to 
the parties, the court and the taxpayers.”139 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                         
today; the internet.  Please stay off the internet . . . oh, and tweeting.  We don’t 
want any tweeting or texting either”).  
135 CACM MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 105. 
136 Hon. Linda Giles, Does Justice Go Off Track When Jurors Go Online?, 55 
BOSTON B.J. 7, 9 (Spring 2011). 
137 ACTL MODEL INSTRUCTION, supra note 112, at 2–3. 
138 Id.  
139 Id. at 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The challenges of social media are great, but so is the resolve of 
the judiciary to protect the guarantee of a fair trial.  There is no perfect 
solution to the growing risk of jurors committing misconduct through 
social networking services like Facebook and Twitter.  After all, the jury 
is a fundamentally human institution, as one of the jurors in the informal 
survey reminded us by stating that “nothing” could prevent her from 
communicating through social media during a trial.  
 
 In this Article, rather than focus on the circumstances under 
which courts must take corrective action on account of juror use of social 
media, we observe that such circumstances exist, and that courts must be 
proactive in discouraging such misconduct.  Anticipatory judicial action 
is necessary not only to protect against actual prejudice at trial and avoid 
lengthy collateral proceedings, but also to preserve the public integrity of 
judicial proceedings.   
 
 Based on informal survey data from approximately 140 actual 
jurors, we suggest that courts should, as a matter of course, employ 
specialized social media instructions at frequent intervals during trial.  A 
well-crafted social media instruction is effective because, simply put, 
jurors listen.  In our discussion, we offer specific comments from actual 
jurors to elucidate this suggestion, and to provide the legal profession 
with a window into the jury box when it comes to social media.  
Although our informal survey data is far from scientific, we hope that the 
voices of actual jurors will add a unique perspective to the discussion, 
and support the growing consensus that social media instructions are a 
necessary and often independently sufficient tool to ensure an impartial 
jury in the age of social media.   
